

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
	:	
DOMINIQUE MARQ GRANNISON	:	
	:	
Appellant	:	No. 354 WDA 2026

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-43-CR-0000641-2025

BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:

FILED: October 15, 2026

Dominique Marq Grannison ("Grannison") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his guilty plea to the crimes of possession of a firearm with an altered serial number and possession with intent to deliver ("PWID") several different controlled substances found within his apartment, including cocaine, fentanyl, marijuana, and various prescription medications.¹ We affirm.

For purposes of this appeal, we glean the following factual history from the suppression hearing record. On the morning of May 16, 2025, Officer Riley Trodden ("Officer Trodden") obtained from a neutral magistrate both an arrest warrant for Grannison on a PWID charge and a search warrant for his person at 340 Baldwin Avenue 2, Sharon, Pennsylvania ("the apartment"). In

¹ **See** 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.2(a); 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30).

support of the search warrant, Officer Trodden's affidavit of probable cause stated:

- (1) In the last [thirty] days[, Officer Trodden] has made two other arrests stemming from [the apartment] that involve Grannison. Both cooperating witnesses advised that this residence is where they frequently have encounters with Grannison.
- (2) The listed address on Grannison[']s Pennsylvania Driver[']s License is [the apartment].
- (3) [Officer Trodden] has observed Grannison exiting his vehicle and entering [the apartment] within the last [forty-eight] hours.
- (4) Cooperating witnesses also advised that Grannison typically has associates with him in his apartment that monitor the door and incoming/outcoming apartment traffic. [Officer Trodden] believes said associates could attempt to prevent police units from searching for Grannison, which is why [Officer Trodden] is requesting a search warrant for the premises.

Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/16/25, at 2 (reformatted).

Soon after procuring these warrants, Officer Trodden and several other officers proceeded directly to the apartment. After "knocking and announcing [their presence] for [approximately] three to five minutes" with no response, they forcibly entered the apartment in search of Grannison. N.T., 10/7/25, at 9, 28. Although the officers did not locate Grannison, they observed drug paraphernalia and contraband in plain view in the kitchen and living room, including: (1) "a white baggie with white powder residue suspected to be crack cocaine[,], a marijuana bong[, and multiple] marijuana roaches . . . on the

kitchen counter[;]" (2) "[w]hite powder on the kitchen floor[;]" and (3) additional "marijuana roaches . . . on a TV stand in the living room." ***Id.***; ***see also*** Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/16/25, at 2.

Officers then secured the apartment while Officer Trodden applied for and obtained a second search warrant authorizing recovery of "cocaine[;] marijuana[;] drug paraphernalia including but not limited to scales, baggies, pipes/bongs for smoking[;] and any other device that may be used to store, ingest or distribute, cocaine, and marijuana." Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/16/25, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted); N.T., 10/7/25, at 10. The ensuing search yielded multiple drugs other than cocaine or marijuana in pill bottles and plastic bags, an iPhone box containing a plastic bag and hand ledgers, a digital scale, and "three separate firearms." N.T., 10/7/25, at 11; ***see also*** Receipt/Inventory of Seized Property, 5/16/25, at unnumbered 1. Upon discovering the firearms, officers suspended their search and obtained a third search warrant for that purpose; the subsequent execution of this warrant revealed no additional firearms.

Later that day, police apprehended Grannison at another location. The Commonwealth charged him with, *inter alia*, possession of a firearm with an altered serial number and PWID. Grannison filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the apartment, raising four Fourth Amendment arguments: (1) police unlawfully entered the apartment without

a warrant supported by “probable cause that [he] was then inside[,]” because the warrant relied on “stale” information; (2) police improperly expanded their search beyond areas capable of concealing a person to include “counters, containers, and surfaces that cannot conceal a human being[,]” rendering the plain view exception inapplicable; (3) the second search warrant, which “authorized the seizure of cocaine and marijuana[,]” was unconstitutionally overbroad to the extent it permitted seizure of evidence outside that scope; and (4) the second and third search warrants were invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree, having been predicated on plain-view observations made during the initial unlawful entry. Motion to Suppress Evidence, 8/20/25, at unnumbered 4-5.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, after which it issued an order denying suppression in all respects. Grannison thereafter entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to the above-identified two offenses in exchange for the Commonwealth agreeing to *nolle prosequi* the remaining charges.² Accordingly, the parties proceeded to a guilty plea hearing, during which the trial court accepted Grannison’s guilty plea. On February 6, 2026, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment. Grannison did not file a post-

² As part of the plea agreement, Grannison reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s suppression ruling.

sentence motion. Grannison filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Grannison raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the initial search warrant for Grannison's person was unsupported by probable cause, law enforcement officers lacked a reasonable basis to believe Grannison was present to justify forced entry into the residence, the plain view doctrine was misapplied, the subsequent search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and lacked particularity, and all evidence seized at [the apartment,] should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Grannison's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).³

Grannison's sole issue presents a challenge to the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. When addressing this type of issue, this Court adheres to the following standard of review:

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal

³ We note with disapproval that, in purporting to present one suppression issue for our review, Grannison's claim instead includes each of the four distinct suppression arguments that he raised in his post-sentence motion, as identified *supra*. Accordingly, by combining each of these arguments into one section of his appellate brief, Grannison has failed to conform to our established appellate rules of procedure regarding the requirement that issues raised on appeal shall be identified and discussed in separate sections of the appellant's brief. **See** Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that the argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued).

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre[]trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect private citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures" by government officials. ***Commonwealth v. Saunders***, 326 A.3d 888, 896 (Pa. 2024) (original brackets omitted). As our Supreme Court has explained, the "[p]rotection of reasonable expectations of privacy is the primary purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures." ***Id.*** In line with this notion, a "search or seizure conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions." ***Id.*** (ellipses and quotation marks omitted).

One such exception, referred to as the plain view exception, instructs that "police may effectuate a warrantless seizure of an item if: (1) the police view the item from a lawful vantage point; (2) the incriminating nature of the item is immediately apparent; and (3) the police have a lawful right of access to the item." ***Id.*** at 897. With respect to the first and third prongs of this

test, these are satisfied “when an officer’s access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment.” ***Commonwealth v. Herlth***, 361 A.3d 604, 621 (Pa. Super. 2026) (*quoting* ***Commonwealth v. Graham***, 721 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1998)). Accordingly, an individual’s Fourth Amendment protections are satisfied where police conduct a search “pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate” following his/her independent determination of “probable cause.” ***Commonwealth v. Fletcher***, 307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). As our Supreme Court has clarified, this requirement holds even where, as here, police are simultaneously “seeking to execute an arrest warrant[.]” ***Commonwealth v. Romero***, 183 A.3d 364, 399, 405 (Pa. 2018).

With respect to the question of a warrant’s validity, our Supreme Court has instructed that the warrant must adhere to the following three prerequisites:

- (1) the warrant must be issued by a neutral, disinterested magistrate;
- (2) the entity seeking the warrant must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense; and
- (3) the warrant must describe particularly the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 263 A.3d 626, 646 (Pa. 2021) (*citing* ***Dalia v. United States***, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)) (reformatted).

As it relates to the second of these prerequisites, “judicial review of a magistrate’s determination of probable cause is limited to the consideration of the ‘four corners’ of the affidavit of probable cause.” **Romero**, 183 A.3d at 406 (citation omitted); **see also** Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(B) (stating that the issuing authority of a search warrant “may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits”). In this regard, “an issuing authority’s probable cause determination is entitled to deference[,]” with a reviewing court’s duty being only to examine “whether a substantial basis exists for the issuing authority’s finding of probable cause.” **Pacheco**, 263 A.3d at 646.

With the above in mind, our Supreme Court has defined probable cause as follows:

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted. In considering an affidavit of probable cause, the issuing authority must apply the totality of the circumstances test which requires it to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit[,] including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that [the aim of the proposed search warrant, including] any contraband or evidence of a crime[,] will be found in a particular place.

Id. at 645-46 (citations, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted). Central to this analysis is the notion that stale information “cannot provide probable cause in support of a warrant.” **Commonwealth v. Janda**, 14 A.3d 147, 158 (Pa. 2011). Importantly, however, the age of information, “alone, does not determine staleness[,]” as a “determination of probable cause is not merely

an exercise in counting the days or even months between the facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant.” **Id.** In this sense, “staleness of information must not be determined by rigorous exactitude[;]” rather a “showing that criminal activity is likely to have continued up to the time of the issuance of the warrant” is sufficient to render “otherwise stale information viable.” **Commonwealth v. Jones**, 668 A.2d 114, 118 (Pa. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).

As it pertains to the third prerequisite for a valid warrant, concerning the particularity with which a warrant must describe the person(s) or object(s) of seizure, our Court has provided the following instruction:

This Court has explained that the constitutional particularity mandate prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant that is overbroad. These issues are separate but related. A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize. This will result in the general rummaging banned by the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, a warrant unconstitutional for its overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation. An overbroad warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search and seizure.

* * * *

After establishing the scope of probable cause, the sufficiency of the description must then be measured against those items for which there was probable cause. An unreasonable discrepancy reveals that the description was not as specific as was reasonably possible. Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and the description in the warrant requires suppression.

Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907, 920 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets omitted).

Pursuant to the above, it is well established that “[w]here a search warrant adequately describes the place to be searched and the items to be seized[,] the scope of the search extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and properly includes the opening and inspection of containers and other receptacles where the object may be secreted.” ***Commonwealth v. Irvin***, 134 A.3d 67, 75 (Pa. Super. 2016) (*quoting Commonwealth v. Walston*, 724 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1998)) (quotation marks omitted). Pertinently, the mere seizure of items that are outside the scope of a search warrant does not automatically imbue a warrant with an unconstitutional lack of particularity requiring suppression, as exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, including the plain view exception, may still apply. ***See Commonwealth v. Anderson***, 40 A.3d 1245, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that police lawfully seized cocaine and drug paraphernalia pursuant to the plain view exception during the course of their limited search for marijuana).

Grannison provides multiple arguments as to why the trial court should have suppressed the evidence that police obtained from the apartment. Grannison initially contends that both the arrest warrant and the search warrant for his person were unsupported by probable cause because “the information used to establish probable cause [was] stale at best.” Grannison’s

Brief at 11. Grannison highlights that police sought the instant search warrant based only on the fact that: “within the [thirty] days prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant, two arrestees claim[ed] to have encounters with Grannison at the [apartment]; . . . no more than [forty-eight] hours prior to the arrest warrant being issued[,]” police saw him “exiting a vehicle[,]” which did not belong to him, “outside the apartment building; and [the apartment] residence was the address listed on [his] driver’s license.” **Id.** at 12. Altogether, Grannison avers that this evidence is insufficient to either establish that the apartment was his current residence, or that he had a “continued presence at this location” such that police would likely find him “within the residence at the time the warrant was executed.” **Id.** at 12-13.

To further support this conclusion, Grannison emphasizes that on the morning of the forced entry into his apartment residence, Officer Trodden testified that: “he did not witness the vehicle associated with Grannison . . . to be present[;] he had no third-party information or tip that Grannison” would be in the apartment residence; “and that between arriving on scene at 9:41 A.M. and forcing entry into the apartment at 9:47 A.M., there was no indication that Grannison was present inside the apartment.” **Id.** at 15. Moreover, Grannison stresses that he “was not found and arrested at [the apartment] or [its] surrounding area[, but was instead] taken into custody at the Pine Tree Village apartments in West Middlesex, Pennsylvania.” **Id.** at 15-16. Thus, Grannison argues that because police “lacked a reasonable belief

that [he] was present within the residence at the time of entry,” their forced entry into the same was *de facto* unlawful “requiring the suppression of all evidence seized” therein. ***Id.*** at 13, 16.

Grannison next argues that the plain view exception could not have granted law enforcement the requisite probable cause to search his apartment absent a valid warrant. In this sense, Grannison asserts that because the forced entry into his apartment was “unlawful from the start[,]” police could not have thereafter discovered any plain-view evidence from a lawful vantage point, as the exception so requires. ***Id.*** at 18. Grannison further maintains that even if police had lawfully entered into the apartment, the plain view exception would still fail to apply in light of the fact that Officer Trodden discovered the evidence at-issue atop the kitchen counter and the living room TV stand—areas, he contends, “beyond the scope of a protective sweep[.]” ***Id.***

In his third suppression argument, Grannison argues that the evidence seized by police pursuant to the second search warrant should be suppressed as a result of the warrant being unconstitutionally overbroad and lacking particularity with respect to the “items to be searched for and seized.” ***Id.*** at 19. In doing so, Grannison reiterates that the instant warrant recognized the following items for seizure: “cocaine[;] marijuana[;] drug paraphernalia including but not limited to scales, baggies, pipes/bongs for smoking[;] and any other device that may be used to store, ingest, or distribute[,] cocaine[]

and marijuana.” **Id.** at 19. However, Grannison claims that despite the fact that the “search warrant only authorized the seizure of marijuana and cocaine[,]” its broad language of, “any other device that may be used to store, ingest, or distribute[,]” cocaine or marijuana improperly allowed police to seize multiple items outside of the warrant’s original scope, including: “prescription pill bottles containing suspected fentanyl[;] Advil pill bottles containing suspected gabapentin[;] Tylenol pill bottles containing suspected [X]anax[;] an iPhone box containing a ledger[;] a metal container containing razors, baggies, and a digital scale[;] various other bags[;] and a solitary box of sandwich bags.” **Id.** Thus, Grannison argues that because the warrant’s broad language could include “almost any household item[,]” and that police indeed seized items that the warrant did not describe “with particularity[,]” the search of the apartment “was unconstitutional” requiring the suppression of “all the evidence seized as a result[.]” **Id.** at 20.

Lastly, Grannison argues that even if the second search warrant was not unconstitutionally overbroad and lacking particularity, he nevertheless claims that both warrants procured by police following their entry into the apartment were otherwise invalid due to the fact that “the affidavits of probable cause supporting [them] were based entirely on observations made during the unlawful entry into [his] residence[,]” as argued above. **Id.** at 21. Grannison thus concludes that “all evidence seized pursuant to [the second and third

search] warrants must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” **Id.** at 22.

The trial court determined that Grannison’s suppression claims were without merit, reasoning as follows:

In the present case, [Grannison] asserts the police lacked probable cause to believe [he] was present in the home at the time of their entry. The record does not support said contention. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates the [apartment] was identified as [Grannison’s] residence on official documentation (e.g., Pennsylvania photo identification, etc.). Further law enforcement had observed [Grannison] at the premises within forty-eight hours prior to execution of the warrant. These facts provided a timely and reliable basis for officers to conclude [Grannison] both resided at, and could be found within, the dwelling. Under the totality of the circumstances, this information was more than sufficient to justify entry for purposes of executing the arrest warrant.

Moreover, *arguendo*, even if one were to discount the recent observation of [Grannison] at the residence, the conclusion remains unchanged. The address had been verified through official channels as [Grannison’s] residence, and the arrest warrant itself had been issued upon the finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Under longstanding precedent, said arrest warrant alone authorized entry into [Grannison’s] residence to effectuate his arrest. The subsequent procurement of additional search warrants, following the officers’ plain-view observations, reflects a measured and constitutionally sound approach by law enforcement; not, as [Grannison] suggests, any deficiency in probable cause. In sum, the entry into the residence was lawful, the warrants were properly obtained and executed, and the evidence seized was not the product of any constitutional violation. Thus, [Grannison] is not entitled to relief under this assertion.

* * * *

[With respect to Grannison’s suppression claim, generally, it] is derivative of his underlying Fourth Amendment claim[, discussed **supra**. As such, it] necessarily rises and falls on the

legality of the officers' entry [into his apartment residence] and their right of access to the evidence ultimately seized.

* * * *

[Accordingly, because the officers' entry into Grannison's apartment was lawful, their subsequent] observations of contraband in plain view did not implicate any constitutional infirmity [given that the] requirements [of the plain view doctrine] are satisfied here.

The record reflects law enforcement officers, while conducting a lawful sweep of the premises in search of [Grannison], observed suspected narcotics and paraphernalia in open view. These observations were made from a location where the officers were entitled to be, and the incriminating nature of the items was readily apparent. Rather than immediately seizing all such items, law enforcement acted with restraint and sought a subsequent search warrant, thereby securing judicial authorization before conducting a more thorough evidentiary search.

* * * *

[Thus, b]ecause the initial entry was lawful[,] and the subsequent searches were conducted pursuant to valid warrants grounded in probable cause, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is inapplicable. There is no antecedent illegality from which the challenged evidence could be said to derive. Accordingly, [Grannison's] motion to suppress was properly denied

Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/26, at unnumbered 5-6, 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

At the outset of our review, we note that because each of Grannison's layered suppression claims presents allegations of legal error by the trial court, our review henceforth is plenary. **See Carey**, 249 A.3d at 1223. That said, we begin our analysis with Grannison's question of whether police

unlawfully entered the apartment pursuant to a search warrant unsupported by probable cause. For purposes of this analysis, we reiterate that our review is constrained to determining whether the contents of the affidavit of probable cause, alone, present a substantial basis to support the neutral magistrate's finding of probable cause. **See Romero**, 183 A.3d at 406; **see also** Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(B).

Instantly, our review of the affidavit of probable cause reflects that Officer Trodden believed Grannison would be within the apartment as a result of the fact that: (1) within the previous thirty days, he had arrested two individuals for incidents involving Grannison stemming from the apartment residence, and that each individual, in their subsequent capacity as a cooperating witness, had informed him that they "frequently" encountered Grannison at this address; (2) the apartment was listed as Grannison's address on his Pennsylvania Driver's License; and (3) he had observed Grannison enter the apartment building forty-eight hours prior. Application for Search Warrant and Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/16/25, at 2.

Taken together, a common-sense review of these circumstances clearly supports the reasonable belief that Grannison was actively and continuously residing in and operating out of the apartment at the time police requested to search the apartment. **See Pacheco**, 263 A.3d at 645-46; **see also Janda**, 14 A.3d at 158; **Jones**, 668 A.2d at 118. Consequently, because these circumstances infer that police would have had, at least, a fair probability of

locating Grannison within the apartment during the course of their search, we conclude that a substantial basis existed to support the neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause. **See Pacheco**, 263 A.3d at 645-46. Accordingly, we hold that Grannison's initial suppression argument is without merit.

Moving to Grannison's second suppression argument—concerning the applicability of the plain view exception—we likewise hold that it is meritless in consideration of our above determination that police entered the apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant. **See Carey**, 249 A.3d at 1223. Indeed, because we determined that police were lawfully within the apartment at the time they discovered the multiple instances of illicit contraband and paraphernalia at-issue (of which Grannison does not challenge its immediately apparent incriminating nature), atop surfaces in both the kitchen and living room, there can be no question that the plain view exception applies. **See Saunders**, 326 A.3d at 897; **see also Herlth**, 361 A.3d at 621. Moreover, to the extent that Grannison further argues that police exceeded the scope of their search of the apartment by locating the aforementioned evidence in places where he could not conceal his person, we find this argument similarly unavailing in light of the fact that the seized contraband and paraphernalia were plainly unobscured and visible to police immediately following their entry into the apartment, and absent any further intervention on their behalf.

We next review Grannison's argument with respect to the validity of the second search warrant, which police used to search the apartment for cocaine and marijuana following their plain-view observations of the same. Here, Grannison essentially contends that the scope of this warrant was unconstitutionally broad and lacking particularity because it allowed police to search containers containing contraband and paraphernalia other than marijuana and cocaine, and therefore seize items outside of the warrant's original scope. However, our case law is clear that "[w]here a search warrant adequately describes the place to be searched and the items to be seized[,], the scope of the search extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found[,]" including "the opening and inspection of containers and other receptacles where the object may be secreted." ***Irvin***, 134 A.3d at 75 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, because the second search warrant clearly designated the apartment as the area in which police could search for marijuana, cocaine, and related paraphernalia, police necessarily possessed the legal justification to search each of the at-issue containers and receptacles for this purpose. ***See id.*** Consequently, as Grannison does not present any further challenge to whether these containers/receptacles could have indeed been used to secret marijuana, cocaine, or affiliated paraphernalia, nor does he argue whether it was immediately apparent to police that the contraband and paraphernalia found therein were illicit, we conclude that police lawfully seized this evidence pursuant to the plain view exception. ***See Anderson***,


40 A.3d at 1249; **see also Saunders**, 326 A.3d at 897; **Herlth**, 361 A.3d at 621. As such, we hold that Grannison's third suppression claim is also without merit. **See Carey**, 249 A.3d at 1223.

Lastly, we observe that Grannison's remaining argument—which challenges the validity of the second and third search warrants obtained by police to search the apartment for marijuana, cocaine, paraphernalia, and firearms—relies on the supposition that police entered his apartment unlawfully. However, given our determination **supra**, that police entered the apartment pursuant to a lawful search warrant supported by probable cause, we hold that Grannison's final suppression claim necessarily fails.

Accordingly, because we determine that the trial court did not commit any legal error by denying suppression with respect to any of the challenged evidence seized by police from within the apartment, we affirm Grannison's judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Benjamin D. Kohler", is written over a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

DATE: 10/15/2026